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The love of truth

机译:对真理的热爱

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摘要

It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense-that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation-it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, I argue that this view is untenable. The truth norm clashes with plausible evidential norms in a wide range of cases, such as when we have excellent but misleading evidence for a falsehood or no evidence for a truth. I will consider various ways to resolve this conflict and argue that none of them work. However, I will ultimately attempt to vindicate the love of truth, by arguing that knowledge is the proper epistemic goal. The upshot is that we should not aim merely to believe the truth; we should aim to know it.
机译:人们常说,在明确的规范意义上,信念是针对真理的,也就是说,只有当p为真时,人们才应该相信p的命题。经常引用这个真理规范来解释为什么我们应该在我们的信仰中寻求证据的正当性,或者为什么我们应该在我们的信仰形成中尝试保持理性-这是因为我们应该相信一个真理,我们应该遵循信仰修订中的证据。在本文中,我认为这种观点是站不住脚的。在许多情况下,例如当我们有极好的但具有误导性的虚假证据或没有真理的证据时,真理规范就会与可能的证据规范发生冲突。我将考虑各种解决冲突的方法,并认为它们都不起作用。但是,我最终将通过证明知识是正确的认识论目标来证明对真理的热爱。结果是我们不应该仅仅相信真理。我们应该以了解它为目标。

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