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Cross-border Lobbying in Preferential Trading Agreements: Implications for External Tariffs and Welfare

机译:优惠贸易协定中的跨境游说:对外部关税和福利的影响

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This paper examines the effect of cross-border lobbying on domestic lobbying and on external tariffs in both Customs Union (CU) and Free Trade Area (FTA). We do so by developing a two-stage game which endogenizes the tariff formation function in a political economic model of the directly unproductive rent-seeking activities type. We find that cross-border lobbying un-ambiguously increases both domestic lobbying and the equilibrium common external tariffs in a CU. The same result also holds for FTA provided tariffs for the member governments are strategic complements. We also develop a specific oligopolistic model of FTA and show that tariffs are indeed strategic complements in such a model.
机译:本文研究了跨境游说对海关联盟(CU)和自由贸易区(FTA)的国内游说和外部关税的影响。为此,我们开发了一个两阶段博弈,该博弈在直接无效的寻租活动类型的政治经济学模型中内生了关税形成功能。我们发现,跨境游说无疑增加了CU的国内游说和均衡的共同外部关税。如果对成员国政府的关税是战略性的补充,那么自由贸易协定也具有同样的结果。我们还开发了一种特定的FTA寡头垄断模式,并表明关税确实是这种模式中的战略补充。

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  • 来源
    《Review of international economics》 |2012年第5期|p.1034-1045|共12页
  • 作者单位

    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division, PO Box 442, St. Louis, MO63166-0442, USA;

    University Car-bondalc, Carbondale, IL 62901-4515, USA;

    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division, PO Box 442, St. Louis, MO63166-0442, USA,Institute for the Study of Economics and the Environment, School of Business and Entrepreneurship, Lin-denwood University, Saint Charles, MO 63301, USA;

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