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Expertise and representation in financial institutions: UK legislation on pension fund governance and US regulation of the mutual fund industry

机译：金融机构的专业知识和代表：英国关于养老基金治理的立法和美国对共同基金行业的监管

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摘要

Decision making is often the responsibility of committees, boards and agencies assuming that many issues are best resolved by smaller, specialised units of decision making. The product of 'representative democracy' and a pragmatic response to 'large numbers' and 'complexity', these bodies are thought to efficaciously combine representation with expertise. Governments use these types of institutions in a variety of ways, and have become a key institution of New Labour's 'third way'. However, there is a growing tension between representation and expertise. If the former provides legitimacy for the latter, the latter may be compromised by the former in matters of requiring sophisticated judgement relative to market agents. It is argued that the tension between representation and expertise is growing for two reasons: perceived 'shortfalls' in democratic practice have prompted governments to broaden the representativeness of many public and private institutions set against an apparent need for greater levels of sophistication in decision making driven by financial markets. These arguments are developed through discussion of that which was inherited from 19th century liberalism, a set of analytical distinctions between deference and delegation, and two examples drawn from the UK and US finance industries. In conclusion, it is noted that apparent solutions, such as relying wholly upon experts, are fraught with danger: there may be such a disconnection between expertise and moral commitment that the former without the latter may give decisions that are hard to justify on any ground.
机译：决策通常是委员会，董事会和机构的责任，假设许多问题最好由规模较小的专业决策部门解决。这些代表机构是“代议制民主”和对“大量”和“复杂性”务实回应的产物，被认为可以有效地将代表制与专业知识相结合。政府以各种方式使用这些类型的机构，并已成为新工党“第三种方式”的关键机构。但是，代表与专业知识之间的矛盾日益加剧。如果前者为后者提供了合法性，则后者可能会因需要相对于市场代理人做出复杂判断的问题而受到损害。有人认为，代表性和专业知识之间的紧张关系在加剧，其原因有两个：民主实践中的“不足”促使政府扩大了许多公共和私人机构的代表性，而这显然是在决策驱动下需要更高水平的明显需求的通过金融市场。这些论点是通过对19世纪自由主义的继承，对尊敬和授权之间的一系列分析区别以及从英国和美国金融业汲取的两个例子的讨论而发展起来的。总之，应该指出的是，明显的解决方案（例如完全依靠专家）充满了危险：专业知识和道德承诺之间可能会脱节，以至于前者如果没有后者就可能做出难以以任何理由辩解的决定。

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  • 来源
    《Society》 |2007年第1期|p.1-23|共23页
  • 作者

    Gordon L. Clark;

  • 作者单位

    Centre for Employment, Work and Finance, Oxford University Centre for the Environment, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QY, UK;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 社会学;
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